Click HERE to see a map of the Australian area of responsibility in Vietnam (Phuoc Tuy Province.)
On 25 February, 3 RAR main body arrived in Vung Tau aboard HMAS SYDNEY and flew direct to Nui Dat by US Chinook helicopters.
Two days later the battalion commenced "In Theatre" training in an area east of Nui Dat.
A Field Battery, 12th Field Regiment, the unit's direct support battery, established Fire Support Base Marj on 28 February.
On 1 March, after only four days in South Vietnam, 12 Platoon D Company had the battalion's first contact for the tour, resulting in one enemy killed in action.
The night of 2/3 March witnessed the first major contact for the battalion when D Company, in a company night position, were probed continually for some nine hours by an unknown enemy force. The enemy were well organised and well armed and made continual use of flares and whistles.
An officer and a soldier in D Company were killed in action during an early probe, and others were wounded during the long contact.
As a result of this contact, "In Theatre" training ceased on 3 March and the battalion switched to a detailed search to the north, east and south of the contact area. No sign could be found however, and it could only be surmised that the enemy was a large party moving east of Nui Dat, between the Duc Thanh area to the north, and the populated areas around Dat Do and Long Dien in the south.
On 7 March, Headquarters 3 RAR and a section of A Field Battery, deployed to Fire Support Base Beth, about 9 miles east of Nui Dat and 2 miles west of the Xuyen Moc District boundary. Operation Briar Patch 1 commenced with companies of 3 RAR deploying into the general area between Nui Dat 2 and Song Rai river.
Companies, in rotation, continued to occupy the Horseshoe feature and patrol from it to the east and north, whilst the remainder searched their areas of responsibility.
On 17 March, after eighteen days on operations, the battalion encountered elements of C3 Company D445 Local Force Battalion (D445), 21 miles north west of Xuyen Moc. In this engagement 9 Platoon C Company met four enemy, killing one, wounding one and capturing two weapons and many important documents. These documents were found on the body who was identified as a platoon commander of C3. Company. As a result of this action, C Company was reinforced with a section of armoured personnel carriers, and the Anti-tank Platoon, and were given the task of searching the area north of Xuyen Moc.
On 20 March, a half platoon of 8 Platoon C Company found a recently used track and were following up, when they heard noises and investigated. A fire fight immediately broke out when the patrol found themselves on top of a newly constructed bunker system.
Helicopter "gunships" were called in after the platoon commander was killed and two other soldiers were wounded. The patrol was forced to withdraw, leaving the platoon commander and one of the wounded where they lay.
The patrol was then commanded by a corporal and a problem arose when they ran out of smoke grenades. Their packs had been dropped on hearing the noise and were now some distance from where accurate enemy fire had them pinned down. Efforts to resupply the patrol with smoke dropped by the helicopter gunships and the direct support Sioux helicopter failed repeatedly because of very thick vegetation, difficulty in pin pointing the exact location of the patrol, and enemy fire directed at the helicopter gunships.
The Company was well spread out at the time of this contact and as it became obvious that speed was essential to reinforce the patrol, the following elements converged on the contact area:
The other half of the platoon from about 1 mile to the north.
7 Platoon from about ¾ of a mile to the south.
C Company Headquarters and 9 Platoon from 1½ miles to the south west.
The Pioneer Platoon in armoured personnel carriers from Fire Support Base Beth 8 miles to the south west.
One troop of tanks and one section of mortars from a position supporting A Company near
Xuyen Moc.
As a result of the above contact, orders were issued for platoons to operate as complete platoons as it now appeared elements of D445 had returned to the Province for operations.
The battalion deployed to the north and north east of the contact area in the hope that the enemy would be encountered in his withdrawal, or that the rest of the battalion would be engaged as he moved south west into the Province. A Company 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion was placed under operational control of 3 RAR to assist in this task. The enemy however, bypassed 3 RAR and was discovered to be in the vicinity of his old haunts in the area of the Song Rai/Suoi Giau rivers. This required a hasty redeployment in armoured personnel carriers and on foot to encircle the area and then search for his position.
A second troop of carriers was provided by lst Australian Task Force (1 ATF) and by 30 March all elements were deployed and the search began.
A Company 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion and D Company 3 RAR were the searching companies. A Company initially occupied a position only a matter of a few hundred yards away from the later located enemy battalion position. Orders to A Company were to search the western bank of the SongRai to a distance of 500 metres.This was considered to be the most likely maximum distance the enemy would occupy a position as he would need to be near water.
On the 31 March as A Company 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) Battalion moved north, 1 Platoon was dispatched to search the area along the Song Rai. At 1430 Hours 1 Platoon found a track showing signs of use in the last 12 hours. Fresh signs of cut timber were found. The remainder of A Company halted while 1 Platoon followed the track, and after only 40 metres, five enemy were seen 10 metres ahead by the forward scout. 1 Platoon imniediately initiated the contact with a sustained burst of machine gun fire. The enemy were surprised and slow to react, but after five minutes heavy enemy fire was being received from the west. Helicopter gunships had been called for, the direct support Sioux helicopter was airborne, and artillery began adjusting fire to the west of the contact point.
The battalion reserve consisting of the Pioneer Platoon in a section of armoured personnel carriers, and a section of mortars who had just arrived in a reserve location to the east of C Company, were ordered to move as soon as possible to the contact area. 4 Troop C Squadron lst Armoured Regiment was ordered to join them.
1 Platoon had been flanked on three sides, had taken casualties and were endeavouring to direct the helicopter gunships onto the bunker system at this time. Difficulty in pin pointing the exact location of 2 Platoon A Company, operating nearby, hampered the employment of the gunships. 2 Platoon had run out of smoke grenades and as they were 400 metres from the bunker system the Sioux helicopter went in to resupply that platoon with smoke.
Confusion existed over whom had thrown a yellow smoke grenade. 2 Platoon thought that 1 Platoon had thrown it and were possibly much closer to the contact than originally thought. The Sioux circled the bunker system to clarify the situation, took ground fire, and was forced to land. The Pioneer Platoon was directed to dismount from the armoured personnel carriers, cross the Song Rai and go immediately to the assistance of 1 Platoon.
The firefight went on for about 45 minutes. The helicopter gunships assisted once the smoke resupply, situation to 2 Platoon was rectified. The enemy then engaged 1 Platoon with 60 millimetre mortars, RPG 7s, grenades and satchel charges, wounding three more soldiers. 1 Platoon then commenced afighting withdrawal and married up with the Pioneer Platoon. Once this had occurred, some 100 metres from the contact point, a medical evacuation helicopter (Dustoff) was called in to evacuate the casualties and in particular one who was seriously wounded. As the Pioneer Platoon threw smoke, so did the enemy, and in the confusion the "Dustoff" aircraft went to the wrong smoke and received ground fire. A door gunner was wounded and later died of wounds. 1 Platoon and the Pioneer Platoon then decided to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Song Rai where the tanks and mortars were, and evacuate their casualties from there. During this withdrawal the enemy followed up the Pioneer Platoon, who sustained one casualty.
Helicopter gunships continued to fire into the bunker area until last light when the artillery and mortars took over.
When V Company 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion was placed under operational control of 3 RAR late in the afternoon of 31 March, Headquarters 3 RAR had the following sub-units under its operational control:
Four rifle companies of 3 RAR (one was however employed from the Horseshoe).
Support Company 3 RAR.
A Company, V Company and Anti-Tank Platoon of 2 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion.
4 and 5 Troops C Squadron lst Armoured Regiment.
1 and 3 Sections 3 Troop A Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment.
A Battery and 161 (NZ) Battery 12 Field Regiment in direct support.
The bunker system was entered by C Company on 2 April but was found to be deserted. Subsequent investigation of the system showed that it consisted of thirty two new bunkers with 18 to 24 inches of overhead protection, covering an area 350 by 200 metres. It is believed that D445, less C1 Company, plus possibly elements of K8 Heavy Weapons Company, were in the bunker system at the time of the contact.
The cordon of companies remained in position from 2-12 April and although the battalion group had seven fleeting contact with enemy groups, D445 showed their patience by successfully exfiltrating the whole force through the cordon including what must have been 8-12 stretcher cases.
This proved to be the first of several times during 3 RAR's tour that the enemy displayed his junglecraft and skill by cleverly disengaging from a contact, and then moving out through seemingly impenetrable allied cordons.
On 12 April, elements of D445 were engaged by other 1 ATF units well north of the cordoned area. As a result, the cordon was withdrawn but 3 RAR elements continued to search in the jungles close to the Song Rai river and its tributaries. The monsoon season had not broken and the enemy were still forced to keep within a short distance of good water supplies.
A Land Clearing Team of heavy bulldozers and associated equipment was deployed into the general area of the major D445 contact. The aim of land clearing was to divide the heavy vegetation into sections thus allowing easier air surveillance of enemy movement, and facilitate previously impossible ground and air deployment of troops. Elements of 3RAR were continually involved in providing close protection for the plant and operators during this long and arduous task.
Operation Briar Patch 11 commenced on 25 April as 3 RAR forces continued to search for D445. The companies moved gradually further north and north east, along the axis of Route 328 and to the north of Xuyen Moc.
On 27 April, Headquarters 3 RAR and a section of A Field Battery moved from Fire Support Base Beth and established Fire Support Base Ziggie about 8 miles north of Beth amidst the tropical gardens of the abandoned village Thua Tich.
On 2 May 1971, an element of 3rd Battalion 33rd North Vietnamese Regiment (3/33 Regt) was reported to have moved south into Phuoc Tuy Province to an area some 4 miles to the north west of Fire Support Base Ziggie.
Elements of 3 RAR deployed in the suspected infiltration area, but 3/33 Regiment withdrew north into Long Khanh Province without contact, and 3 RAR turned its attention once more to its principal area of interest.
By 10 May 1971, intelligence reports were continually stressing the probability of a threat against Xuyen Moc village from the north by D445 and with this in mind, companies of 3 RAR operated in the infiltration routes to the north of the village. Although some sign of local Viet Cong guerillas was found, no contact was made.
During May, continuing intelligence reports had indicated the presence of 3/33 Regt and D445 in the area east of Route 2, on the Long Khanh-Phuoc Tuy border. On 5 June 1 ATF deployed against these enemy units on Operation Overlord.
The 1 ATF plan was to block with A Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion in the south, and 2nd Battalion 8th US Cavalry in the east. 3 RAR was the searching force moving south east towards the junction of the US Cavalry and 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion.
All rifle companies had been relocated at Nui Dat by 3 June to make the redeployment more economical. Battalion Headquarters deployed from Fire Support Base Ziggie (20 miles to the north east of Nui Dat) to Fire Support Base Pamela by American and Australian Iroquois and Chinook helicopters at dawn on 5 June.
3 RAR companies were inserted on the morning of 5 June using two means. A and B Companies were transported up Route 2 by vehicles to a helicopter pick up zone, from where they were then flown to conduct their air insertions. C and D Companies moved by armoured
){kind=link}